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Wills - The Doctrine of Election - Testator's will, after leaving
most of his property to his wife, devised to his daughter his one-half
interest in the homestead which he owned with his wife as a joint
tenant. He also bequeathed to the daughter the proceeds of a life insurance policy of which his wife was the designated beneficiary; and
$500 to each of his sisters, to be paid from the proceeds of another
insurance policy of which his wife was the designated beneficiary. The
will was admitted to probate and the widow petitioned for construction
and "for an order and judgment determining what property belongs to
the estate and to whom deceased's property is to be distributed." The
heirs and devisees petitioned to require the widow to elect whether
she would take under the will or at law. Held: This was a proper case
for election and the trial court should have required the wife to elect
to take under the will or at law. However, the widow has the absolute
right to postpone her election for one year from the time of the filing
of the petition for probate. By virtue of her assertion of her claims
under the will the widow elected to take under the will. She thereby
divested herself of the interest in the joint property and the insurance
policy proceeds that accrued to her upon the testator's death. Will of
Schaech, 252 Wis. 299, 31 N. W. (2d) 614 (1948).
The case presents an interesting aspect of the power of a testator
to control by will property owned by another. The insurance became
the wife's property and the testator's estate had no interest in it.
Therefore the proceeds of the insurance policy could not, under the
insured testator's will, become the property of someone other than the
widow beneficiary against her will.1 Likewise, the testator's interest in
the realty, which he owned with his wife as a joint tenant, would under
the doctrine of survivorship pass to the surviving joint tenant. 2 But
the doctrine of election, and the rule that a devisee who has accepted
the beneficial provisions of a will is barred from rejecting the disadvantageous terms, require a conclusion that the devisee has confirmed
and ratified the terms of the will in toto. Therefore the devisee is
equitably estopped from asserting title to his or her own property. Thus
where a devisee is given property owned by the testator, and another
devisee is given property not owned by the testator but owned by the
first devisee, it is tantamount to an exchange of the first devisee's
property for the property of the testator. Since the offer of exchange
is dependent upon an acceptance by the devisee, and is not forced upon
her by law, the result is not inequitable. It is reasonable to assume that
the devisee will elect to accept the benefits under the will if they are
favorable. It would defeat the testator's intention to allow the benefits
1 Christman v. Christman, 163 Wis. 433, 157 N.W. 1099 (1916).

2

Tiffany, Real Property, Sec. 282, p. 283.
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to pass under the will without the burden of the disadvantages. 3 From
a practical standpoint, this doctrine can be used to advantage by a
testator seeking a desired result; for example, it can be used to consolidate holdings of corporate stock along a particular family line. Also,
the doctrine stands as a warning to the legal practitioner to inventory
the assets of the estate and have them appraised as soon as possible
after testator's decease; then to determine with the client whether to
accept the benefits under the will or not. The statutory right to elect
is absolute for a year,4 and at the end of the year the devisee will be
deemed to have made the election, 5 unless he or she performs an act
which a court might construe as an act of election. Claiming under
the will, or qualifying as executor thereunder, has been held to be such
an act.6 Presumably a petition asking solely for a construction of a
will would not be construed as an act of election.
Because of the elements of offer and acceptance involved, these
cases would appear to fall in the realm of contract. The doctrine of
election is founded on the theory of the surrender of the right for
the gift.7 "But an election not to take under a will does not form the
element of offer and acceptance required of a contract." s However,
the act of claiming under the will would constitute such acceptance.
Some courts have stressed the matter of the clearness of the testator's intention to require an election. In a case where the testatrix devised to one W, in addition to an annuity, only a portion of land which
she was under contract to devise in toto, the court held that a case for
election did not arise, saying: "The intention (to raise an election) must
clearly appear from the document itself, and unless its language unequivocally shows a purpose to dispose of the property belonging to
the donee the law will not presume an intention to do so." 9 This case
appears to go beyond the rule in the majority of these cases. In most
of them the courts say that it must be made clear by the will beyond
all reasonable doubt that the testator intentionally assumed to dispose
of his devisee's real estate before he can be held to an election. 10 Most
courts look at the substance of the will as well as the express terms.
In the principal case the Wisconsin Court cited several cases from outside jurisdictions in support of the general proposition that it must be
3Allen v. Boomer, 82 Wis. 364, 52 N.W. 426 (1892).
4 Wis. Stats., 233.14 (1947), and principal case at p. 306.
5Principal case, where a year having passed, the widow was declared to have
elected.

Allen v. Boomer, supra fn. 3.
Thompson on Wills, 3rd Edition, Sec. 470, p. 685 (1947).
8 Porter v. Spring, 250 Mass. 83, 145 N.E. 52 (1924), where the court said: "The
act of the plaintiff in filing an election to claim curtesy was the exercise of a
personal right. No contract or attempt to make a contract is involved"'
9 Wilson v. Safe Deposit Trust Company, 183 Md. 245, 37 Atl. (2d) 321, 152
ALR 892 (1944).
10 Young v. Biehl, 166 Ind. 357, 77 N.E. 406 (1906).
6
7
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clear on the face of the will that the testator intended to dispose of
the donee's property." From the discussion of the law in the principal
case it would appear either that the court overlooked this phase of the
case, or was of the opinion, without expressing it, that it was clear
from the will that the testator intended to dispose of his wife's interest in the property.
A point of interest appears in the case in regard to the joint tenancy.
There is no doubt that it is ended, inasmuch as the four' unities have
been severed. 2 The result is a tenancy-in-common. 1 3 From the practitioner's standpoint the exact time of the severance is important. The
severance occurs when the widow elects, or when the statutory period
of election terminates; and the termination "relates back" to the time
14
of the death. The only right which vests is the right of choice.
Therefore the liens of judgment creditors on the testator's interest
must be considered "suspended" until the election is made. At the
testator's death they would not be liens, 15 but since title passes at the
time of election, the liens would then settle on the half-interest devised
to the daughter, the widow's portion becoming free and clear at severance. The reasoning may well be held to apply to the right of the widow
to the rents and profits of the homestead, with the final settlement and
account determined by the election made. It should be noted at this
point that the statute governing the homestead and the election in this
state has been well drawn and covers the case without further discussion."
It might also be noted that an examiner of titles should make inquiry, in instances of joint tenancy ownership and upon knowledge of
the death of one of the joint tenants, as to the existence of a will. If
a will is existent it should be admitted to probate so the examiner can
determine if it attempts to dispose of a part or all of the joint property.
If it does, then both the surviving joint tenant and the devisee should
join in the conveyance, unless the surviving tenant filed a formal election under the will. If no will has been admitted it would seem that
the surviving joint tenant's conveyance to a purchaser should be construed as an election not to take under the will, if one should subsequently be filed and admitted to probate.
11

Young v. Biehl, 166 Ind. 357, 77 N.E. 406 (1906) ; Smith v. Butler, 85 Tex.

126, 19 S.W. 1083 (1892); Waggoner v. Waggoner, 11 Va. 325, 68 S.E. 990
(1910); Golden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W. (2d) 328 (1943); Morrison v. Fletcher, 119 Ky. 488, 84 S.W. 548 (1905); Thurlow v. Thurlow, 317
Mass. 126, 56 N.E. (2d) 902 (1944).
12 Tiffany, Real Property, Sec. 281, p. 282.
3 Pickenbrock and Sons v. Knger, 136 Iowa 534, 114 N.W. 200 (1907).
'14Watrous
v. Watrous, 180 Iowa 884, 163 N.W. 439 (1917).
5
1 Musa v. Segelke & Kohlhans Co., 224 Wis. 432, 272 N.W. 657 (1937).
16 Wis. Stats. 233.14, see also 233.12 and 233.13.
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On the face of the matter, this case appears to overturn the long
-established law of survivorship in Wisconsin. Actually this is not so.
What does occur is that title becomes vested in the surviving joint
tenant at the moment of the other's death, subject to divestment by
his or her own act of electing to take the benefits under the will. The
election operates to sever the joint tenancy. The case opens the door
for the severing of joint tenancies by indirection, making possible certain transfers which might be difficult to effect personally during the
lifetime of the testator.
PAUL E. HERBST

